Pork Barrel Politics: Manipulating Social Assistance Policies to Maintain Personal Power

Abstract

This research is conducted qualitatively through secondary sources from various previous studies and reports from various related institutions to analyze the pork barrel political agenda that is indicated to be carried out ahead of the 2024 election and explain how this pork barrel political agenda is carried out for certain political purposes. The involvement of the social assistance budget as a weapon used in carrying out this political agenda becomes a more specific discussion regarding the type of policy of pork barrel politics. Findings related to the effectiveness of this strategy in creating vote barns are also described in this research.

Introduction

Politics in relation to power definitely requires a strategy for framing the flow of the process to achieve political goals. Politicians use different strategies in planning their political direction. These strategies do not only include black and white policies that can be distinguished by the general public. In addition, many political actors use grey political schemes. This scheme can be identified as a strategy that looks right and does not violate any rules, but at the same time, the goals to be achieved have been contaminated with personal interests that are carried out above public policy. The term pork barrel politics is appropriate for this scheme. More specifically, pork barrel politics involves government projects that are targeted at specific geographical areas. These activities are directed at the public and funded with public money in the hope that the public will provide political support to certain candidates (Marasabessy & Siagian, 2024).

This political scheme is part of a populist program resulting from the existence of dynasty politics built on the basis of paternalistic relationships (Djati, 2013). This "paternalistic" relationship refers to a dynamic akin to that of a father and child, wherein protection and benefits are provided to individuals who support the authoritative figure. This power relationship is facilitated through the redistribution of public funds by local political dynasties to garner political support. Such distribution is termed as the redistribution of populist programs, where political leaders utilize these funds to finance projects deemed popular or appealing to the public, such as infrastructure development, welfare programs, or social assistance. Through this redistribution, political leaders aim to strengthen their support base among voters and maintain their power in the long term (Grossman & Helpman, 2022). It is also elucidated in a study (Rantau et al., 2019) concerning pork barrel political policies. This policy directs the pattern of resource distribution by focusing on specific regions that serve as electoral bases or are expected to become electoral bases for election participants, whether individual candidates or political parties. The term "Pork Barrel" was first introduced by John A. Ferejohn in his work titled "Pork Barrel Politics: Rivers and Harbors Legislation, 1947-1968" to refer to the phenomenon of distributing state resources for the purpose of gaining victories in the United States Congress.

Discussing pork barrel politics, this scheme is closely related to patronage politics. Patronage politics is a political relationship that relies on money, goods, or economic opportunities being distributed to gain political support (Rumambi, 2019). Political pork barrels are part of patronage politics focused on government projects targeted at specific geographic regions (Dalupe, 2020). Unlike money politics, which emphasizes the practice of giving money or other resources for specific purposes, such as supporting particular political interests, this practice may also include buying votes from voters by offering material rewards. Money politics can involve cash, but sometimes it also entails assistance in the form of physical facilities or other support for a specific candidate's campaign (Marasabessy & Siagian, 2024).

Problem Statement

The political dynamics that occur make politicians use various strategies to achieve their political goals. Political capital is used to produce political actions that are beneficial and can strengthen the position of the political actors or political institutions concerned. Pork barrel politics is one of the politicians' strategies for strengthening their influence to gain many votes and support in a political competition. The widespread use of this strategy, which is organized through policies that concern the community in certain areas, creates its own consensus to be researched. This leads to the question, "How does the pork barrel political strategy navigate within the political landscape of Indonesia?" Furthermore, an analysis concerning the effectiveness of the political strategy also becomes a necessary component of this political study.

Why Does Social Assistance Funding Become a Weapon in Executing This Strategy?

The emergence of new policies in the run-up to elections is often associated with pork barrel political strategies by incumbents to maintain their position in the next election contest. Often, they utilize fiscal policies that release budgets during the election period to influence voters by making policies such as investment projects in certain areas, spending budgets targeted at certain groups, and making tax cuts aimed at benefiting certain parties (Drazen & Eslava, 2006). Policy funds, or discretionary funds, are budgets that tend to be used by regional heads who have plans to run for re-election in the next regional head contest. The use of policy funds is based on Permendagri Number 21/2011, which includes the allocation of grant and social assistance expenditures. Both are part of the indirect expenditure category, whose allocation basis tends to be subjective because it is not based on specific targets. This makes these two budgets a weapon for politicians to carry out pork barrel political strategies in the period leading up to the election (Pratiwi & Nasution, 2022). The indicator for the utilization of the pork barrel strategy is the utilization of grant and social assistance expenditure budgets, observed through the difference in the allocation of grant and social assistance budgets before and during the election period. This aligns with research conducted by Ritonga & Alam (2010), which concludes that there is an increase in the ratio of grant and social assistance budgets to total expenditure in regions where the regional leaders are running for re-election as incumbents compared to regions where the regional leaders are not running for re-election in that area as non-incumbents.

Tracing the Main Holders of Pork Barrel Political Strategy Actors

The condition of leaders with incumbent status tends to do a lot of Pork Barrel politics, according to John Ferejohn's research (Wilk, 2010), there are 3 reasons underlying this statement. First, using pork barrel politics will give the impression that the perpetrator has helped by bringing projects to the place he leads, which will help the sustainability of his campaign. Second, pork barrel politics can improve the political image of incumbent candidates as leaders who prioritize the interests of their constituents. This condition can provide greater opportunities than those of other political opponents. Third, they have the opportunity to control laws and regulations that they think can benefit them and can control project policies in their constituencies. Egoism in the familial relationship in government politics is also the cause of this pork barrel strategy. This is because the direction of egoism tends to keep certain families in power. Therefore, political dynasties in government based on family relationships have a considerable influence on the pork barrel policy to foster and strengthen the social cohesion of the ruler with the community (Gunanto, 2020). So that leaders who are found to be running for re-election in the next election and leaders who are indicated to have a familial relationship with the next leader, according to John Frejohn in Wilk (2010) and Gunnantoanto (2020), tend to try to carry out this pork barrel political strategy.

Understanding the Characteristics of Pork Barrel Politics

According to research by Wilk (2010) and Gunanto (2020), parties that already have power are more likely to use "pork barrel" politics. This is because incumbent leaders and leaders who are likely to be part of a political dynasty are the ones who use policy funds to carry out these kinds of political strategies. Shedding light on political dynasties in Indonesia, familial relationships still strongly influence the hierarchy of government and politics at both the regional and national levels. At the national level, under President Jokowi, political dynasty is considered to have started with the ascent of Gibran Rakabuming Raka as mayor of Solo in 2020 and as a vice presidential candidate in 2024 (Dona, 2022). Delving into the phenomenon of political dynasties can provide an example of how the mechanism of the pork barrel is carried out. In the study by Saragintan & Hidayat (2017), the characteristics of pork barrel policies are explained. These characteristics include:

1. Conducted by a government leader, especially one facing an election, with the aim of gaining support and being re-elected.
2. Using the state budget, which is usually channeled through government programmes and allocation of funds from the central government to the regions.
3. Regionally-oriented or territorial in nature, where fund allocations are targeted only to assist a specific group of people within a particular region.
4. Pork barrel politics is regionally focused or confined to specific spatial contexts, so only certain communities can benefit from the allocation of funds.
5. The practice does not bind constituents to vote for the incumbent, as assistance is generally provided before the election without a formal agreement.

Identifying the Politicization of Social Assistance Funds as Pork Barrel Politics

Based on the characteristics mentioned, we can trace one by one the indications of pork barrel politics in Indonesia. The 2024 election contest announced Gibran Rakabuming Raka as a vice presidential candidate alongside Prabowo Subianto, creating significant questions for some sectors of society regarding political dynasties (Bintang et al., 2023). Jokowi, as the president of Indonesia and the holder of government power, has the opportunity to intervene in the continuity of the 2024 election process. In distributive politics, according to Stokes (2013), rulers or incumbents have an advantage because they have access to resources sourced from the government. They are also closer to the people because the government interacts directly with them through government programmes. In addition, as executors of government programmes, incumbents also act as actors who conduct direct transactions with the community. In accordance with the first characteristic of pork barrel political policy, it is carried out by a government leader, especially those who will face general elections, with the aim of gaining support and being re-elected. Therefore, this condition is in line with the first characteristic described.

Related to the second characteristic, which is the practice of pork barrel politics utilizing state budget usually channeled through government programs and fund allocations from the central to local levels, it can be associated with the increase in social protection budget preceding the 2024 election. The rise in the social protection budget in 2024, as outlined in the State Budget Report (Kemenkeu RI, 2024a) prior to the election, serves as an initial indication of pork barrel politics carried out by Jokowi to maintain his support base. This is also confirmed by a statement from Jusuf Kalla, Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia for the 2014–2019 period, agreeing with the allegations of political content in the distribution of social assistance funds, especially seeing the trend of increasing social assistance funds closer to election time, both at the national and local levels. One of the main reasons for the utilization of grant and social assistance programs for the benefit of specific political actors is the populist nature of these programs, which are often exploited for political gain in general elections, whether at the national or local level (Rahmanto et al., 2021).

Further detailed breakdown is provided in the Monthly Realization Report of the State Budget by Kemenkeu RI (2024b), which illustrates that there was an increase in the realization of the budget for social assistance in January 2024, reaching Rp12.45 trillion. The realization of social assistance expenditures includes: (1) distribution of conditional cash transfers (PKH) to 9.2 million Beneficiary Families (KPM); (2) distribution of assistance through the staple food card program to 18.5 million KPM; (3) distribution of premium assistance to 96.7 million participants of the National Health Insurance (JKN) Premium Assistance Program; and (4) distribution of assistance through the Smart Indonesia Program (PIP) for 4,000 students and the Smart Indonesia Card (KIP) for 4,000 university students. The increase in social protection budget and the rise in social assistance burden in the State Budget report were also undertaken by Jokowi ahead of the 2019 election campaign when he ran for re-election as president for the 2019–2024 period. Data related to government social programs outlined in the State Budget reports from 2015–2018 tends to fluctuate. The decrease in bansos funds in 2015 was due to the reclassification of budgets from several ministries, such as the Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing for goods purchases and the Ministry of Education and Culture for teacher allowances. However, Bansos funds were increased again nearing the presidential election in 2018 by the government. This was considered a reasonable strategy by the incumbent, Jokowi, for his electoral interests in the next election period. It was seen as an opportunity for Jokowi, as the incumbent, to enhance his image ahead of the next general election (Setiawan & Setyorini, 2018). According to different explanations of Jokowi's actions regarding the trend of giving out social assistance before the election, these actions meet both the second and fifth characteristics of pork barrel policy, as explained by Saragintan and Hidayat (2017).

Another prominent characteristic indicating the practice of political pork barrel by Jokowi is that this social assistance practice is regional or context-specific, where fund allocations are targeted to assist a specific group of people within a particular area, thus enabling only certain communities to benefit from the fund allocation. As reported by the presidential website source cited in Narasi (2024), Jokowi's visits during the period from October 2023 to February 2024 were predominantly focused on the Central Java region, with a total expenditure of 13.2 million. Therefore, a series of policies undertaken by President Jokowi ahead of the election include the distribution of social assistance by increasing the social protection budget and distributing it to specific regions that constitute his support base, in line with the five characteristics of someone engaging in pork barrel politics as explained by Saragintan & Hidayat (2017).

Effectiveness of Pork Barrel Politics Strategy through Budget Policy in Enhancing Politicians' Electability

The lengthy journey of exploring how pork barrel politics is carried out by incumbent leaders with the aim of benefiting certain parties. Pork barrel politics is part of the budgetary political agenda. Budgetary politics is the political power process in which various interests involved in policy determination and budget allocation interact. In the political context, the State Budget (APBN) is a political document that reflects the agreement between the legislative institution (DPR) and the executive (President) (Aziz, 2016). The political narrative built by incumbent candidates through the budgetary politics of pro-people social assistance can create a positive image in the eyes of the public. This can enhance the incumbent's electability. This was evidenced by the increase in Jokowi's electability in the 2019 election, when he ran for re-election. During the pre-presidential election period in 2019, Jokowi's electability showed a more stable trend, ranging from 50–60%, while Prabowo Subianto's electability was still below Jokowi's, ranging from 30–35%. The high electability of Jokowi ahead of the 2019 presidential election is in line with the trend of increased allocation of social spending and social assistance programs (Rahmanto et al., 2021). The increase in electability in the 2024 election was also experienced by the pair of Prabowo Subianto and Gibran Rakabuming Raka after the social assistance policy issued by President Jokowi as a form of pork barrel politics. This was reported in the survey report by LSI (2024), which shows the trend of presidential candidate preferences from January 2023 to February 2024, leading up to the election process.

The drastic increase occurred in October 2023, when the Constitutional Court's decision regarding Gibran's candidacy announcement as the running mate of Prabowo Subianto was announced. Subsequently, the increase continued in December and extended until February 2024. Similar to the events leading up to the 2019 election, the increase in electability of the pair supported by the incumbent leader is based on the distribution of social assistance funds, marked by the increase in the social protection budget to 496 trillion rupiah in November 2023 (Kemenkeu RI, 2024a). The allocation of social assistance funds clearly boosts the electability of the respective candidate pairs because the increase in social protection budget is directly proportional to the high electability of the incumbent candidate; therefore, the effectiveness of pork barrel politics is evident in increasing greater voter support (Rahmanto et al., 2021).

Conclusion

Indonesia's political dynamics are heating up at the momentum of the elections, making some politicians have to rack their brains to seek support from the public. Pork barrel politics has become one of the most promising options to increase voter support in political contests. Pork barrel politics is not only carried out by the upper layers of government, but in the contestation of regional head elections, it is also a powerful weapon in gathering votes. Social assistance, which is the main weapon in this pork barrel political strategy, has been used since the previous government. Social assistance programmes that tend to be subjective are easy targets for politicians in hastening pork barrel politics. The effectiveness offered by this strategy has become very tempting for many parties. The increase in electability due to an improved political image is a source of voter support from the public. The finesse of compartmentalizing budget politics is also the main reason this strategy can work. The public can judge how the mechanism of democracy in Indonesia works and how politicians are increasingly adept at creating policies that appear to be in the public interest as well as their personal political interests. Understanding the policies made by the government in relation to the use of the social protection budget must be scrutinized by the public because the budget in this fund is very vulnerable to being deflected by parties with personal interests. The people, as the highest power holders in a democratic system, are the key to how this country runs through the political dynamics that accompany the running of its government. Therefore, it is a great responsibility for the people to eliminate political actions that harm them in the future, including this pork barrel political action.