Abstract
This research is conducted qualitatively through secondary sources from various previous studies and reports from various related institutions to analyze the pork barrel political agenda that is indicated to be carried out ahead of the 2024 election and explain how this pork barrel political agenda is carried out for certain political purposes. The involvement of the social assistance budget as a weapon used in carrying out this political agenda becomes a more specific discussion regarding the type of policy of pork barrel politics. Debates about electoral influence and the limits of the available evidence are also described in this research.
Pork Barrel Politics
Politics in relation to power definitely requires a strategy for framing the flow of the process to achieve political goals. Politicians use different strategies in planning their political direction. These strategies go beyond policies that the public can clearly judge as right or wrong. Many political actors also use methods that fall into a grey area. These methods can look proper and follow formal rules while still placing personal interests above public policy. Pork barrel politics is one example. More specifically, it involves government projects that are targeted at specific geographical areas. These activities are directed at the public and funded with public money in the hope that the public will provide political support to certain candidates (Marasabessy & Siagian, 2024).
This political scheme is part of a populist program resulting from the existence of dynasty politics built on the basis of paternalistic relationships (Djati, 2013). This "paternalistic" relationship refers to a dynamic akin to that of a father and child, wherein protection and benefits are provided to individuals who support the authoritative figure. This power relationship is facilitated through the redistribution of public funds by local political dynasties to gain political support. Such distribution is termed as the redistribution of populist programs, where political leaders use these funds to finance projects deemed popular or appealing to the public, such as infrastructure development, welfare programs, or social assistance. Through this redistribution, political leaders aim to strengthen their support base among voters and maintain their power in the long term (Grossman & Helpman, 2022). It is also elucidated in a study (Rantau et al., 2019) concerning pork barrel political policies. This policy directs the pattern of resource distribution by focusing on specific regions that serve as electoral bases or are expected to become electoral bases for election participants, whether individual candidates or political parties. John A. Ferejohn studied pork-barrel politics in his work titled "Pork Barrel Politics: Rivers and Harbors Legislation, 1947-1968" to refer to the phenomenon of distributing state resources for the purpose of gaining victories in the United States Congress.
Discussing pork barrel politics, this scheme is closely related to patronage politics. Patronage politics is a political relationship that relies on money, goods, or economic opportunities being distributed to gain political support (Rumambi, 2019). Political pork barrels are part of patronage politics focused on government projects targeted at specific geographic regions (Dalupe, 2020). Unlike money politics, which emphasizes the practice of giving money or other resources for specific purposes, such as supporting particular political interests, this practice may also include buying votes from voters by offering material rewards. Money politics can involve cash, but sometimes it also entails assistance in the form of physical facilities or other support for a specific candidate's campaign (Marasabessy & Siagian, 2024).
Problem Statement
The political dynamics that occur make politicians use various strategies to achieve their political goals. Political capital is used to produce political actions that are beneficial and can strengthen the position of the political actors or political institutions concerned. Pork barrel politics is one of the politicians' strategies for strengthening their influence to gain many votes and support in a political competition. The widespread use of this strategy, which is organized through policies that concern the community in certain areas, creates its own consensus to be researched. This leads to the question, "How does the pork barrel strategy operate in Indonesian politics?" Furthermore, an analysis concerning the effectiveness of the political strategy also becomes a necessary component of this political study.
Social Assistance Funding as a Pork Barrel Instrument
The emergence of new policies in the run-up to elections is often associated with pork barrel political strategies by incumbents to maintain their position in the next election contest. They often use fiscal policies that release budgets during the election period to influence voters by making policies such as investment projects in certain areas, spending budgets targeted at certain groups, and making tax cuts aimed at benefiting certain parties (Drazen & Eslava, 2006). Policy funds, or discretionary funds, are budgets that tend to be used by regional heads who have plans to run for re-election in the next regional head contest. The use of policy funds is based on Permendagri Number 21/2011, which includes the allocation of grant and social assistance expenditures. Both are part of the indirect expenditure category, whose allocation basis tends to be subjective because it is not based on specific targets. This makes these two budgets a weapon for politicians to carry out pork barrel political strategies in the period leading up to the election (Pratiwi & Nasution, 2022). The indicator for the utilization of the pork barrel strategy is the utilization of grant and social assistance expenditure budgets, observed through the difference in the allocation of grant and social assistance budgets before and during the election period. This aligns with research conducted by Ritonga & Alam (2010), which concludes that there is an increase in the ratio of grant and social assistance budgets to total expenditure in regions where the regional leaders are running for re-election as incumbents compared to regions where the regional leaders are not running for re-election in that area as non-incumbents.
Tracing the Main Holders of Pork Barrel Political Strategy Actors
The condition of leaders with incumbent status tends to do a lot of Pork Barrel politics, according to John Ferejohn's research (Wilk, 2010), there are reasons underlying this statement. First, using pork barrel politics makes voters think the incumbent has helped by bringing projects to the place he leads, which helps the sustainability of his campaign. Second, pork barrel politics can improve the political image of incumbent candidates as leaders who prioritize the interests of their constituents. This condition can provide greater opportunities than those of other political opponents. Third, they have the opportunity to control laws and regulations that they think can benefit them and can control project policies in their constituencies. Egoism in the familial relationship in government politics is also the cause of this pork barrel strategy. This is because the direction of egoism tends to keep certain families in power. Therefore, political dynasties in government based on family relationships have a considerable influence on the pork barrel policy to foster and strengthen the social cohesion of the ruler with the community (Gunanto, 2020). So that leaders who are found to be running for re-election in the next election and leaders who are indicated to have a familial relationship with the next leader, according to John Ferejohn in Wilk (2010) and Gunanto (2020), tend to try to carry out this pork barrel political strategy.
Characteristics of Pork Barrel Politics
According to research by Wilk (2010) and Gunanto (2020), parties that already have power are more likely to use "pork barrel" politics. This is because incumbent leaders and leaders who are likely to be part of a political dynasty are the ones who use policy funds to carry out these kinds of political strategies. In Indonesia, family relationships still strongly influence the hierarchy of government and politics at both the regional and national levels. At the national level, under President Jokowi, political dynasty is considered to have started with the ascent of Gibran Rakabuming Raka as mayor of Solo in 2020 and as a vice presidential candidate for the 2024 election (Dona, 2022; Bintang et al., 2023). Political dynasties show how pork barrel politics can work in practice. In the study by Saragintan & Hidayat (2017), the characteristics of pork barrel policies are explained. These characteristics include:
- Conducted by a government leader, especially one facing an election, with the aim of gaining support and being re-elected.
- Using the state budget, which is usually channeled through government programmes and allocation of funds from the central government to the regions.
- Regionally-oriented or territorial in nature, where fund allocations are targeted only to assist a specific group of people within a particular region.
- Pork barrel politics is regionally focused or confined to specific spatial contexts, so only certain communities can benefit from the allocation of funds.
- The practice does not bind constituents to vote for the incumbent, as assistance is generally provided before the election without a formal agreement.
Identifying the Politicization of Social Assistance Funds as Pork Barrel Politics
Based on the characteristics mentioned, we can trace one by one the indications of pork barrel politics in Indonesia. The 2024 election contest announced Gibran Rakabuming Raka as a vice presidential candidate alongside Prabowo Subianto, creating significant questions for some sectors of society regarding political dynasties (Bintang et al., 2023). Jokowi, as the president of Indonesia and the holder of government power, has the opportunity to intervene in the continuity of the 2024 election process. In distributive politics, according to Stokes (2013), rulers or incumbents have an advantage because they have access to resources sourced from the government. They are also closer to the people because the government interacts directly with them through government programmes. In addition, as executors of government programmes, incumbents also act as actors who conduct direct transactions with the community. In accordance with the first characteristic of pork barrel political policy, it is carried out by a government leader, especially those who will face general elections, with the aim of gaining support and being re-elected. Therefore, this condition is in line with the first characteristic described.
Public budgets give incumbents access to state resources, but a budget increase alone does not establish an electoral purpose. The following chart covers social protection, a broader category than social-assistance expenditure. These categories must therefore be distinguished when examining alleged politicization (Kemenkeu RI, 2024a; Rahmanto et al., 2021).
2023 is an outlook and 2024 is the approved APBN budget; neither is final realized expenditure. Social protection includes more than social assistance.
Further detailed breakdown is provided in the Monthly Realization Report of the State Budget by Kemenkeu RI (2024b), which illustrates that there was an increase in the realization of the budget for social assistance in January 2024, reaching trillion. The realization of social assistance expenditures includes:
- distribution of conditional cash transfers (PKH) to Beneficiary Families (KPM)
- distribution of assistance through the staple food card program to KPM
- distribution of premium assistance to participants of the National Health Insurance (JKN) Premium Assistance Program
- distribution of assistance through the Smart Indonesia Program (PIP) for students and the Smart Indonesia Card (KIP) for university students
Rahmanto et al. (2021) discuss rising social expenditure before the 2019 election as a possible incumbent electoral strategy. Their analysis uses a literature review and secondary data. Changes in budget classification and program coverage must be considered before comparing years. Assistance distributed near an election can warrant scrutiny, but timing alone does not establish its motive or effect on voting.
The geographical distribution of assistance also warrants scrutiny. Election-dispute proceedings broadcast by Narasi (2024) linked presidential visits to areas considered electorally important. These were litigants’ arguments, not automatically court findings. Testing them requires visit schedules, assistance amounts, recipient numbers, and each region’s needs-based eligibility criteria.
Effectiveness of Pork Barrel Politics for Electability
Budget politics brings legislative and executive interests together in decisions about public spending (Aziz, 2016). Rahmanto et al. (2021) interpret social-spending and incumbent-support trends before the 2019 election as a relationship requiring scrutiny. Comparing trends without controlling for other factors, however, cannot establish how much support changed because of social assistance.
In Constitutional Court Decision No. 1/PHPU.PRES-XXII/2024, the majority found no convincing causal evidence linking assistance to vote totals. Three dissenting judges proposed repeat voting over assistance politicization or official partiality in certain regions. This disagreement does not establish a measured electoral effect.
Public Oversight of Social Assistance
Social assistance still requires oversight because legitimate programs can face misuse. Assessment should examine budget authorization, recipient criteria, distribution dates, officials’ involvement, and evidence of requests to vote for a candidate. These records help distinguish program delivery, conflicts of interest, and proven violations. Assistance to people in need should not automatically be classified as pork-barrel politics solely because it is distributed near an election.